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"The sharp corner is reality,  
everything else can only be imagined" 
(Cavazzoni 2015, 150). 
1. Foreword 
 
Objectivity and subjectivity are the two poles of a contraposition that goes through almost every aspect of 
human experience (Nagel 1979). To this pervasiveness the field of knowledge organization is no exception: 
sometimes in this there is a clash (especially at a theoretical level) and more often a meeting (at a practical 
level) between instances that underline how the way we organize information, documents and knowledge 
depends mostly on the way we see them and use them and other instances that instead insist on a certain 
degree of independence and "resistance" of these entities as regards points of view and purposes. But before 
dealing with this topic, it will be useful to start by making some remarks about the objective/subjective 
dialectics applied to the concepts of information, document and knowledge. 
 
2. Objective and subjective aspects of information 
 
Between 2005 and 2011, in some important international information science journals, a heated debate 
took place between Marcia J. Bates (2005, 2006, 2011), Professor of Information Studies at the Graduate 
School of Education and Information Studies, University of California and Birger Hjørland (2007, 2009, 
2011), Professor of Knowledge Organization at the Royal School of Library and Information Science in 
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Copenhagen. The issue of discussion was the concept of information. For Bates all "patterns of organization 
of matter and energy", that is to say any disposition, sequence or configuration (even accidental) of physical 
elements (such as the arrangement of pebbles on a beach or of ink on a page), could already be considered 
relevant to that concept (Bates 2005). Hjørland, on the contrary, underlined that it was meaningless to 
consider as proper information what (remaining at the mere physical level) cannot inform about anything 
until there is not a biological organism able to be informed or to acquire some form of knowledge by 
examining the patterns at issue. 
This conflict, however, can probably be overcome by those unitary approaches (Hofkirchner 2010, Gnoli 
and Ridi 2014) to the various meanings of the term "information" that prefer to call "data", "configurations", 
"information atoms" or "potential information" the exclusively syntactic information represented by the 
patterns and to name, instead, "contextualized data", "significant data" or "actual information" the semantic 
information that emerges when patterns enter into relations with an organism, placing them in a reciprocal 
dialectic relation (Ridi 2010, 3-6). After all, using the words of Hjørland's (2007, 1449) (who, in turn, refers 
to the so classical as ambiguous definition of information by Bateson (1972, 271-272 and 315) "as a 
difference which makes a difference") the objectivistic approach, according to which "any difference is 
information", and the subjectivistic one, according to which "information is a difference that makes a 
difference (for somebody or for something or from a point of view)", can more plausibly be seen as two 
successive stages of the same process, both logical and chronological, rather than in a relationship of mutual 
negation (Hofkirchner 2010, 85-97). 
On the other hand, Bates herself recognizes that "information exists both subjectively and objectively" 
(Bates 2015), that her work "contains ideas that mostly complement, rather than conflict with, those of 
Hjørland" (Bates 2011, 2038) and that "animals perceive data, not information" (Bates 2005), so much as to 
place information intended as "patterns of organization of matter and energy" (Bates 2005) at the basis of a 
pyramid of the various meanings of the term "information" taken from Goonatilake (1991) which also 
includes the following steps, semantically richer, of genetic, neural-cultural and exosomatic information 
(Bates 2006). And Hjørland himself, although he gives the utmost importance to the subjective aspects and 
to the social context of information, certainly does not assert that information is created ex nihilo from each 
organism in a totally inner and autonomous way (or, we might almost say, "oneiric" or " hallucinatory"). In 
fact, in his many works (among which Hjørland and Albrechtsen 1995,  Hjørland and Hartel 2003, Hjørland 
2010) dedicated to the various "knowledge domains" into which the human society is divided into, he has 
theorized a structuring of information not only in an epistemological and in a sociological dimension, but 
also in an equally important, ontological dimension, that concerns the objectivity of known phenomena as 
well as of the documents about them. And he even published an article in favour of the Arguments for 
philosophical realism in library and information science, in which he recommends to "not confuse reality 
with users’ beliefs or preferences" (Hjørland 2004, 499). 
 
3. Objective and subjective aspects of documents 
 
As the discussion between Bates e Hjørland was used to exemplify the wider debate between the 
supporters of objectivity and subjectivity of information, so the discussion published in 2012 in the Italian 
electronic journal "Bibliotime" can help to synthesize the analogous contraposition traceable in literature 
about the nature of the material objects that "contain" or "convey" information, that is to say documents. On 
that occasion Claudio Gnoli (Pavia University), Paola Rescigno (Bologna University), Riccardo Ridi (Ca’ 
Foscari University, Venezia) and Alberto Salarelli (Parma University), starting from the various definitions 
of "document" collected and commented by Buckland (1997), wondered whether the fact that a given 
physical object is legitimately considered a document depends (exclusively or predominantly) on some of its 
objective characteristics (such as the fact that it contains DNA or alphabetic signs) or on some social 
decisions (such as the fact that a human being decided to use it to distribute  information or that a museum 
decided to accept it in its collections) or on the subjective capacity of single individuals to extract from it 
information that was recorded also unintentionally (as it can happen to those who examine a fossil or a crime 
scene). 
Answering these questions each of the participants in the debate underlined the prevailing aspects that 
he/she found sometimes underestimated, remembering for example how only the objects especially created 
or modified by human beings for information or communication purposes are proper "native documents” 
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(Gnoli 2012a), how the "constitutive power of places" (Rescigno 2012) deputed to the selection, 
conservation, organization and fruition of documents (archives, libraries, museums) plays an important role 
in their definition and identification, how "first of all the individual dimension has to be taken into account in 
the interpretation of the objects that populate the world” (Salarelli 2012) and how it is possible to distinguish 
between "intentional documents" and "unintentional documents" (Ridi 2012), categories that are, however, 
separate only by a socially and individually malleable boundary, and therefore mobile. Yet none of the 
participants went so far as to deny resolutely the relevance of at least some objective, subjective or social 
aspects in the individuation of documents. And reading that discussion again today, we can observe how it 
revealed that, paradoxically, the most unquestionably "objective" documents, produced by nature long 
before humans inhabited the Earth (like the seasonal growth rings of trees and the DNA), are often 
acknowledged as such only after individual or social discoveries. We can also observe that, equally 
paradoxically, the documents that have been universally considered as such since longer and to a greater 
extent and that are therefore included in the collections of archives, libraries and museums, are instead 
unquestionably "native" and "intentional" documents created by humans (and therefore in some way 
"subjective") like books and paintings. 
Lastly, we can see how the same logical (and sometimes also chronological) gradation, detectable 
between the syntactic information (i.e. data) and the semantic information (i.e. knowledge), can also be 
found in documents. Any physical object is potentially (i.e. philosophically) a document, provided that it 
includes (or is included in) a pattern that marks "a difference", but it really becomes a document (that is that 
it begins to be treated as such) only when somebody or something "recognizes" the pattern and therefore 
uses the object itself as a document, as actually (i.e. pragmatically) informative (Ridi 2010, 10-14). 
 
4. New realism 
  
Much more extended (both chronologically and for the number of authors involved and the overall 
cultural impact) among the debates on the objective and subjective aspects of information and of documents 
is the discussion about the same aspects relating to human knowledge, which can be dated back at least up to 
the presocratic Greek philosophers and that counts among its characters figures like Plato, Aristotle, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein, just to mention a few names of the Western 
tradition. Therefore it is inevitable to be even more selective, simply summarizing those discussions through 
few texts of the last decades.  
In this case too it may be useful to start from a very recent (still ongoing) debate (Santarcangelo and 
Scarpa 2015), initiated in 2011 by Maurizio Ferraris, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the Torino 
University, when he fulfilled a process of progressive distancing from his "subjectivistic" juvenile positions 
to get a more "objectivistic" position coining the effective label of "new realism", which, since then, he has 
been propagandizing in many publications (including De Caro and Ferraris 2012, Ferraris 2012). The 
fundamental thesis of new realism is that after decades of predominance, on the international philosophical 
scene, of theories about human knowledge that underline its uncertainty, its relativity and the unavoidable 
"constructive" elements introduced in it from the point of view of the knowing subject (variously articulated 
and denominated by a number of authors too large to be cited here such as "postmodernism", 
"constructivism/constructionism", "contextualism", "perspectivism", "relativism", "skepticism", 
"pragmatism", "logocentrism", "panlinguism", "panculturalism", "deconstructionism", "poststructuralism", 
"antirealism", "irrealism", "weak thought" or "transcendentalism", the latter not be confused with the 
homonymous nineteenth-century American literary movement of which Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry 
David Thoreau were among the leading figures), the time has come to underline that an objective 
"unamendable" reality exists (Ferraris 2009, 86-88; Ferraris 2012, 34-37), which is independent from our 
points of view and "resistant" to our interpretations, the characteristics of which are perhaps not easy to 
identify and to describe exactly, but with which we must inevitably come to terms. In other words, after a 
long period with a predominance of epistemology, gnoseology and hermeneutics (which are the names with 
which, with nuances related to countries, languages and schools of thought, the subdisciplines of philosophy 
that deal with how and if it is possible to know the world are called) now metaphysics and ontology should 
be reevaluated, which are instead philosophical subdisciplines that deal with how and if the world exists and 
is structured (Ferraris 2009, 57-84 and 317-318; Ferraris 2012, 31-33). In other words, again, to Nietzsche's 
sentence (1887) "there are no facts, only interpretations" that for Ferraris (2009, 70-78; 2012, 2) constitutes 
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the fundamental thesis of the opposite front to new realism, one should reply by highlighting "the extremely 
broad spheres of reality that are independent of theories and of cultural conditioning" (Ferraris 2009, 81). 
Nevertheless according to various authors, not at all impressed by Ferrari's realistic "conversion" (Veca 
2012, D’Agostini 2013, Di Cesare et al. 2013, Totaro 2014), his argumentations are substantially based on 
the the straw-man rhetorical device, consisting in inventing a caricature of  the opponent that is easier to 
refute, and his own positions are still largely imbued with the  constructivism that he claims to have 
repudiated and that he wants to fight. 
 
Which "realism" is a realism that is defined in opposition to an non-existent antirealism, never claimed by anyone? 
[...] And why on earth would the halfconstructivisim (not everything is construction, not everything is interpretation) 
be "realism": a very reasonable position, but epistemological and not metaphysical, and all in all already known to 




As for the first critique made against Ferrari, perhaps no one in the entire history of Western philosophy 
(and, in any case, surely not in the last half century) has never gone so far as to deny that "something" 
independent of our mental schemes exists. Solipsism, that is the hypothesis that the world is only a sort of 
hallucination of the knowing subject, is a skeptical theory considered by many philosophers (including 
Descartes, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Russell and Sartre), but only to reject it, although 
considering it at times theoretically unassailable from a strictly logical point of view (Thornton 2004; 
Mazzantini and Sacchi 2011; D’Agostini 2013, 131-137). Strictly speaking, not even the idealist George 
Berkeley (1685-1753), often mistakenly considered the champion of solipsistic irrealism, believed that his 
motto "esse est percipi" ("to be is to be perceived") involved the hallucinatory (or completely creative) 
character of human knowledge, thanks to the divine guarantee of its compliance with an external reality that 
coincides with the ideas present in God's mind (Downing 2011). Also the "anarchist" epistemologist Paul 
Karl Feyerabend (1924-1994), considered one of the most radical constructivists of the twentieth century, 
admits that "our entire universe […] is an artifact constructed by generations of scientist-artisans from a 
party yielding, partly resisting material of unknown properties" (Feyerabend 1999, 224). Not even the 
nineteenth century German idealism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel can be considered a form of irrealism or 
antirealism, because of its strong objectivistic component and of its acute awareness of the limits of the 
empirical human knowledge (Sedgwick 2000). Even the nihilistic thesis of Gorgias (485 AC - 375 AC) 
"nothing exists" (arrived to us, moreover, only through later testimonies) has been discussed for at least a 
century whether it is to be taken literally or is, rather, a confutation (or a parody) of Parmenides's thought 
(Migliori 1973, 157-202; Reale 2004, 71-82; Bonazzi 2010, 39-50). Not even the illusoriness of the 
empirical world typical of Eastern philosophies such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Taoism prevents that they 
involve a deeper and stable reality, called in various ways (Capra 1975, 130-131; Feyerabend 1999, 10-12). 
Therefore, in order to trace forms of explicit and resolute theoretical negation of the "external world", we 
should carefully sound the history of thought both Western and Eastern, deepening the possible antirealism 
of philosophical positions that are in any case completely extraneous to postmodernism such as that of the 
seventeenth century French physician Claude Brunet (Mazzantini and Sacchi 2011, 10845) or the “actual 
idealism” of the Italian neoidealist Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944), who, according to some commentators, 
acts "the radical elimination of all the objectivistic elements that still remain in Hegelism" (D’Agostini 1999, 
117; see also Severino 2014, 31), achieving "the negation of millennia of realistic thought, or of failed 
attempts to get out of realism" (Severino 2014, 21). 
Most, if not all, postmodernist philosophers would therefore have no difficulty in agreeing with the 
neorealist thesis that "in very many cases, the sharing of a world depends much more on the characteristics 
of the objects than on the agreement of conceptual schemes" (Ferraris 2009, 81), rather emphasizing that 
there are also different cases and that the conceptual schemes nonetheless play an important role, and that 
Ferraris himself has to admit that "unlike ancient skeptics, postmodern constructionists do not doubt the 
existence of the world" (Ferraris 2012, 31). Even Nietzsche, if we contextualize the incriminated sentence 
within the fragment from which it was extracted (Veca 2012, 520-523; D’Agostini 2013, 34-45; Gemes 
2013, 557; Totaro 2014, 101), actually distances himself both from the most radical objectivism and 
subjectivism, showing how interpretations are the meeting place of both those instances and questioning not 
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so much the existence of "facts" but rather that of inaccessible "facts in themselves", of which not even the 
most radical realist could state anything beyond the mere assumption of existence. 
 
Against positivism, which halts at phenomena — "There are only facts" — I would say: No, facts is precisely what 
there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing.  
"Everything is subjective," you say; but even this is interpretation. The "subject" is not something given, it is 
something added and invented and projected behind what there is. — Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter 
behind the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis.  
In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no 
meaning behind it, but countless meanings . — "Perspectivism."  
It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each 
one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm (Nietzsche 1887). 
 
Not to mention the other almost coeval passage in which, after expressing a similar thesis, Nietzsche 
himself admits that this too is, after all, only an interpretation, refusing to attribute to it an excessive 
explanatory claim (Nietzsche 1886, aphorism 22; D’Agostini 2013, 34). 
On the other hand Ferraris himself (2009, 73) admits that "the disparity between the situations brings out 
the difference between the sphere of the sciences – the search for absolute truth – in which the claim that 
there are no facts, but only interpretations might make some sense, and the sphere of life and experience, 
where such a thing makes no sense whatever", an observation that probably Nietzsche himself would accept, 
since he expressed his thought (published posthumously, by the way) philosophizing and not having a 
conversation in a pub. 
 
6. Natural, ideal and social objects 
 
For the second critique, Ferraris's theses are "argumentations under which lies a logic similar to the one 
present in most of postmodern speeches" (Veca 2012, 521) and the basic thesis that Ferraris proposes is, by 
his explicit admission, "a modest or minimalist realism" (Ferraris 2012, 48), that is to say a "moderate 
constructionism" (Ferraris 2012, 102), which is shaped more like "a “treaty of perpetual peace” between the 
realist insight and the constructionist one" (Ferraris 2012, 63) rather than like an innovative and invincible 
argument able to finally defeat any form of skepticism and relativism. In fact Ferraris divides the world in 
three big categories of objects: natural, ideal and social (Ferraris 2009, 32-54), building around the social 
ones a whole philosophy of documentality ("Papers, archives, and documents constitute the fundamental 
element of the social world. Society is not based on communication but on registration, which is the 
condition for the creation of social objects" Ferraris 2009, 319), in which the postmodern constructivism is 
totally included, with a integrating and founding role. 
 
In the world of social objects […] belief determines being, given that these objects depend on subjects. […] While 
transcendentalism is not applicable to natural objects, it fits social objects perfectly. The Kantian thesis that intuition 
without concepts are blind does not apply to lakes and storms (which remain as they are independently of our 
conceptualizations), but it does apply to mortgages and conferences. […] Naked life is nothing but a remote starting 
point, and culture begins very early making for a clothed life, which is manifested in registrations and imitations: 
language, behaviors, and rites (Ferraris 2009, 318-319).  
 
As for natural and ideal objects (assuming that it is obvious to distinguish them from the social ones), 
which should, at least themselves, be completely immune from constructivism, but which nonetheless are 
strangely less central than the social ones in Ferraris's works even after his neorealistic conversion, one 
could, however, doubt their independence from the human gaze since Ferraris (2009, 34-35) declares that he 
considers "natural" the objects that can be met in ordinary experience and not the objects described by 
science (as if only science were contaminated by changeable theoretical constructs while ordinary 
experience allowed a direct access to things "in themselves", stably universal and not oriented by social, 
cultural or personal prejudices) and that he calls "ideal" those entities that, like numbers, "exist outside time 
and space independently of subjects" (Ferraris 2009, 38), but the numerous social applications of which 
cannot but share the issues of the corresponding typology of objects. 
In addition to natural, ideal and social objects, to complete Ferraris's "catalog of the world" (2009, 7-54), 
there are also those "subjects", defined as "individuals whose prime characteristic is to have a central 
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nervous system that is sophisticated enough to capture and fix representations" (Ferraris 2009, 22), which 
makes us think that they are, all things considered, only a particular typology of natural objects. 
 
7. Irrealism, hyperrealism and "moderate" realisms 
 
The contrast between neorealists and postmodernists is made less sharp than Ferraris depicts it also by the 
particular consonance of the theses of two philosophers who should rather militate on the opposite sides of 
that conflict of ideas. On one side there is the American philosopher Nelson Goodman (1906-1998), who in 
his classic book of 1978 Ways of worldmaking defines his own position as "a radical relativism […] that 
eventuates in something akin to irrealism" (Goodman 1978, x), since the fundamental thesis of the volume, 
synthesized by the editor of the Italian edition is that 
 
there is not one world; there are many worlds, none of which all-inclusive. More precisely, there is one world for each 
different way to combine and build symbolic systems. There is one world for each version and vision of it in the 
different scientific theories, in the works of different artists and novelists, in our perceptions as influenced by those 
works and theories in addition to the circumstances, the past experiences, the interests that guide us, by our 
observation capacity and so on. 
Since for Goodman these different versions or visions can be equally important and independently interesting, even 
correct, without having to presume or request their reducibility to a single common basis, it follows that the worlds 
that derive from them have the same degree of reality: no world can arrogate to itself the exclusive right to the title of 
"real world", no one can claim to be the world to which the different versions refer to with different languages and 
modalities (Varzi 2008, pix-x). 
 
On the other side is the young German philosopher Markus Gabriel, who, in his recent volume with the 
surprising title (especially for a declared follower of Ferraris's "new realism") Why the world does not exist 
(Gabriel 2013), does not support the inexistence of the material universe described by astronomy and 
physics, but rather the inexistence of an hypothetical totality that includes not only physical objects but also 
"a good number of objects […] which man cannot touch" (Gabriel 2013, 8) like our thoughts, national states, 
unrealized possibilities and numbers. For Gabriel, each of these objects exists, but only within a "field of 
sense" (Gabriel 2013, 65-72) that connects it with many other objects, but never with all of them, because 
each field of sense (also called "object domain" or "ontological province" at page 49) corresponds to a 
particular perspective, which at the same time includes and excludes certain types of objects. Numbers exist 
in the field of sense of mathematics, rhinos in the field of biology, unicorns in the field of mythology, 
thoughts in the field of psychology, but there is not a single field of sense (a "domain of all domains", 
Gabriel 2013, 73) that contains them all and that we could really consider "the world", that is to say "the 
whole" (Gabriel 2013, 18), because, in order to exist, it would, in turn, need to appear in a wider field of 
sense, with a paradoxical effect of infinite regress. 
The two theories are different, because the first one multiplies the worlds, while the second one does not 
recognize even one, but their points of contact are, however, considerable, because both of them doubt that 
there is an only all-inclusive reality, proposing in its place innumerable different realities, incommensurable 
with one another. Goodman presents his own theory as an "irrealism" (Goodman 1978, x), Gabriel as a "new 
realism" (Gabriel 2013, 1), but both theories could perhaps be best classified as forms of "hyperrealism", 
alluding with this term (unrelated to its various meanings in mathematics, semiotics, music and visual arts) 
to a sort of multiplication and enrichment of reality and of admission of its inexhaustible polyhedricity. In 
any case Goodman's supposed irrealism is not so extreme as to become nihilism (or "trivialism, that is to say 
that everything is true, everything is fine, legitimized by the end of legitimizing discourses", D’Agostini 
2013, 86), justifying the creation, by human beings, of any world, because he "refused to consider each 
construction of the world equally good: there would be correct constructions and incorrect constructions, and 
this depends on their conformity with the purposes for which they are used and on their practical 
effectiveness" (Magni 2010, 57; see also Chiodo 2006, 98-104). That is to say, in Goodman's words, his is "a 
radical relativism; but severe restraints are imposed" (Goodman 1978, 94). And Gabriel's neorealism, at the 
very moment he admits the relevance of scientific disciplines and of personal points of view for identifying 
the different fields of sense, cannot leave out of consideration elements of constructivism, whether he admits 
it or not. 
Gabriel and Ferraris are also in good company in not being able to free themselves completely from 
constructivism, because all the authors (Akeel Bilgrami, Mario De Caro, Michele Di Francesco, Umberto 
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Eco, Maurizio Ferraris, Diego Marconi, Hilary Putnam, Massimo Recalcati, Carol Rovane, John Searle) that 
contributed to a miscellaneous volume (De Caro and Ferraris 2012) that, in the editors' intentions, 
highlighted on the back cover, should have provided "an extraordinary battery of arguments in favour of 
realism, but also giving space to dissenting voices", turn out to be (some more and some less, but no one 
excluded) moderate constructivists, that is thinkers that give an important, but never exclusive, role to social, 
cultural, anthropological, linguistic and personal points of view in delineating the way we know the world. 
So much so that, after reading the book, we have the impression of having attended, rather than an epic 
reckoning against postmodernism, an interesting but subtle discussion within the postmodern movement 
itself, about which and how many constructivist elements are ineliminable from contemporary epistemology,  
and not about their complete elimination. 
In this regard, Eco's position is exemplary; although not citing them explicitly, he refers to Popper's 
(1935) falsificationism (a theory is scientific only if it is possible to construct an experiment which could 
prove its falsity), to Poincaré's (1902) conventionalsim (scientific theories are conventions, but not arbitrary) 
and to Goodman's (1984, 31) radical but not nihilistic relativism ("a true version is true in some worlds, a 
false version in none") in order to propose a "negative realism" according to which 
 
any interpretative hypothesis is always revisable (and, as Peirce said, it is always exposed to the risk of fallibility) but, 
if we can never say definitely if an interpretation is right, one can always say when it is wrong. There are 
interpretations that the object to interpret does not admit. [...] Certainly our representation of the world is perspectic, 
connected to the way in which we are biologically, ethnically, psychologically and culturally rooted so that we never 
believe that our answers, even when they appear, after all, "good", must be considered definitive. But this 
fragmentation of the possible interpretations does not mean that everything goes. In other words: there is a hard core 
of the being, such that some things that we say about it and for it cannot and must not be taken as valid (Eco 2012, 
105-106). 
 
Besides, independently of the debate on Ferraris's and Gabriel's "new realism", we can also mention other 
forms of sophisticated contemporary realism. They accepted the Humean (Lecaldano 2007) and Kantian 
(Ferrini 2007) critiques that irreversibly demolished the classical realistic claim to know appropriately an 
external world completely independent from our gaze and therefore they came to terms, to some extent, with 
some elements of constructivism. Franz M. Wuketits (1990), for example, proposes an "hypothetical 
realism" which links to the evolutionary epistemology of Karl Popper (1972), Konrad Lorenz (1973) and 
Donald Campbell (1974). Wuketits underlines how our perceptive and knowing apparatus is the result of a 
very long natural evolution and thus binds us to unavoidable biological limits. But, for the same reason, it is 
also very likely that is provides us with an idea of the external world realistic enough to allow us to survive, 
reproduce and, in fact, evolve. On the contrary, Roy Bhaskar's "critical realism" (Bhaskar 1979, Budd 2010) 
opposes both to the ingenuous realism of positivism and to the radical constructivism of postmodernism, 
trying to combine a realistic ontology with a relativistic epistemology through the concept of depth of 
reality, which our knowledge can penetrate more or less deeply but never completely1.  
 
8. Objective and subjective aspects of knowledge organization 
 
Moving from the analysis of the limits and the conditions of human knowledge in general to the analysis 
of a particular type of second-level knowledge which is knowledge organization itself, we often wondered if 
it is better, in order to classify and index objects, people, institutions, concepts, documents and information, 
to use categories based on an ontological approach (that is on the characteristics of the entities that we want 
to order), on an epistemological approach (that is on the way we know those entities), on a pragmatic 
approach (that is on the kind of use we want to do both of the entities themselves and of their various 
arrangements) or, more likely, on varied combinations and alternations among these approaches (Gnoli 
2008, 77-99; Ridi 2010, 90-97). 
For example, recently Kleineberg (2013) started from the ancient Indian parable of the blind men that, 
touching the different parts of a single elephant, give completely different descriptions of it,                                                         
1 For Eco's negative realism and other forms of "moderate" contemporary philosophical realism see chapter Strani realismi of 
D’Agostini (2013, 139-146). Further forms of contemporary philosophical realism are mentioned by De Caro and Ferraris (2012, 
x-xi) and others are discussed in the other chapters of D'Agostini (2013). 
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incommensurable with one another, to illustrate the positions of the two opposite fronts that have been 
facing in the international studies of the past decades about knowledge organization. On one side are 
"modernists", that underline how the elephants is, after all, only one, and therefore it must be possible to 
integrate its various descriptions (different because partial) in a single picture, that focuses on the "what" of 
knowledge. For this "ontological" approach to knowledge organization "a main goal is to classify the totality 
of entities or phenomena in a universal and often faceted knowledge organization system (KOS) as neutral 
and objective as possible" (Kleineberg 2013, 341). Inversely, for "postmodernists", each blind man has not 
simply a different (partial) access to the same elephant, but he produces, through his own experience, a type 
of different elephant, just as real and complete as the one of the other blind men. The "development of 
context-transcending or even universal KOS's is regarded rather skeptically" (Kleineberg 2013, 341) by 
those who prefer this "epistemological" approach, that focuses on the "who" of knowledge and on its 
historical, cultural and psychological background. 
Kleineberg considers incomplete both these approaches and proposes to integrate them, using KOS 
(knowledge organization systems, that is to say structured and controlled lists of terms used to organized, 
manage and search for information, documents and knowledge in a particular field or for a particular 
purpose, described for example by Zeng 2008 and Gnoli 2015) which take into account both the "what" and 
the "who" of knowledge, and, in addition, also the "how", that is to say the methods used in cognitive 
investigations, trying, in this way, to satisfy at the same time, both the ontological approach and the 
epistemological and the methodological ones. Kleineberg's attempt at synthesis is certainly commendable 
and goes in the same direction in which this article is moving, that is to say the ascertainment of the 
difficulty in separating clearly the objective and the subjective aspects of knowledge organization, not to 
mention the possible claim to eliminate completely one of the two, so much so that not even all the authors 
selected as representative of the modernist or postmodernist approaches always maintain consistently that 
position, as Kleineberg (2013, 341) himself admits. At most, one could perhaps raise doubts of a "financial" 
kind about the costs of indexing procedures that take into account so many aspects and one could note that 
the choice of the parable of the blind men is a little too oriented towards the "ontological" front, at least as 
much as it would have been to take as an example in favour of the "epistemological" front the assistant of an 
illusionist, seemingly sawn in half that, however, at a closer examination would prove to be, instead, two 
different women, only one half of each is visible. 
Not too dissimilar from Kleineberg's "ecumenic" proposal (2013) is Gnoli's (2012b). Gnoli starts from the 
"ontological" exhortation of the León manifesto (ISKOI 2007) to use phenomena (rather than disciplines, as 
it occurs mainly in most current systems) as basic units of KOS and enhances it, providing (tab. 1) six 
"dimensions of knowledge organization" (the elusive reality in itself, phenomena, the perspectives from 
which phenomena are faced by human beings, the supports that carry the corresponding information, the 
collections of documents in which knowledge is recorded and preserved, and in the end the homogeneous 
groups of users that use those documents), studied by six corresponding disciplines or groups of disciplines 
(mysticism, ontology, epistemology, bibliology, library science together with archive science and 
museology, sociology). 
 
α (reality) [mysticism?] 
β phenomena [ontology] 
γ perspectives [epistemology] 
δ carriers [bibliology] 
ε collections [library science] 
ζ   users [sociology] 
 
Table 1. Dimensions of knowledge organization according to Gnoli, taken from Gnoli (2012b, 270). 
 
It is worth noting, as to the conclusions (sect. 11) of this article, that Gnoli, one of the authors cited by 
Kleineberg (2013) as particularly representative of the modernist trend in the studies of knowledge 
organization, includes in his pattern also the epistemological dimension, typical of the postmodernist trend, 
as it contains "the disciplines, […] the domains addressed by different research communities, the human 
activities to which knowledge is intended to be applied, the communicative functions performed in 
transmitting knowledge, the theories adopted and methods applied, the historical epoch and geographical 
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context in which knowledge is produced and, in general, all viewpoints adopted by authors" (Gnoli 2012b, 
271)2. Consistently with this "multidimensional" opening, Gnoli himself, during the final debate of the ISKO 
meeting in Bologna on 20 April 2015, accepted the possibility of adding even a seventh "dimension", 
relating to the objectives, preferences, habits and constraints of individual users and to the characteristics of 
different and changing information needs and behaviours of each of them, studied by psychology and 
information science. 
Inversely (and just as significantly) the postmodernist (again according to Kleineberg 2013) Hjørland, 
although he believes that "concepts of phenomena (etc.) are theory dependent and interest-dependent" 
(Hjørland 2008, 338) because "a neutral position from which the world can be observed objectively" does 
not exist (Hjørland 2008, 337; see also Nagel 1986 and Ridi 2010, 90-94) and therefore "all interpretations 
are circular, indeterminate, and perspectival" even when we are "describing and classifying phenomena in 
the world", he concludes that he does not believe that "this leads to skepticism or antirealism, because some 
theories do a better job than others" (Hjørland 2008, 338). This is a concept that he reaffirmed and examined 
closely in a very recent article (Hjørland 2015) in which he demonstrates the strict reciprocal dependence 
between theories and KOS, even more relevant for knowledge organization if we think that "even every-day 
concepts […] are theoretical constructions and have theoretical implications for how we think and act" 
(Hjørland 2015, 114) and that "often what has been considered “facts” later turns out to be a theory" 
(Hjørland 2015, 116). Therefore Hjørland's constructivism and postmodernism do not prevent him from 
acknowledging that neither all theories nor all KOS perform equally well their task in describing and 
organizing the world or its parts, admitting thus implicitly that "out there" there must be something 
independent from them that helps us to compare their efficacy. 
 
9. Objective and subjective levels of reality 
 
A concept that may be particularly useful to focus the difference between objectivistic and subjectivistic 
approaches to knowledge organization is that of "levels of reality" (Gnoli 2006; Poli 2007; Gnoli and Ridi 
2014, 450-453), used by various KOS of objectivistic kind, among which the Information coding 
classification (Dahlberg 1982) and the Integrative levels classification (ISKOI 2004), as a backbone to 
connect to one another, at the same time in a coherent but not reductionist way, all the entities that KOS 
themselves aim to classify. According to this approach, present in innumerable variants in the history of 
philosophy and science at least since Plato, all that exists is part of a unique hierarchical "great chain of 
being" (Lovejoy 1936) ranging from simple to complex and admitting no voids. In the twentieth century the 
prevailing version of this idea was the concept, influenced by Darwin's theories and by other forms of 
evolutionism, of "emergent" or "integrative" levels of reality. These are successive layers (in a logical and, at 
times, also chronological sense) of entities increasing more and more complex and autonomous, provided 
with characteristics absent in the previous layer but that emerge as truly innovative, although based on them, 
such as the case of chemical properties compared to physical ones and of biological properties compared to 
chemical ones (Juarrero and Rubino 2008). Among the philosophical theories on the emergent levels of 
reality that mainly influenced the most recent studies in knowledge organization, it is worth remembering 
Nicolai Hartmann's (1882-1950), which provides a stratification of reality in four levels (inorganic, organic, 
psychic and spiritual) autonomous and irreducible among them but resting on one another in order to exist 
(Hartmann 1940, Scognamiglio 2008). 
But there is also (at least) another meaning of the expression "levels of reality": it is the one to which the 
title of the homonymous conference (Piattelli Palmarini 1984) held in Florence in 1978  refers. On that 
occasion some twenty philosophers, logicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, biologists, paleontologists, 
historians, linguists and writers (including, in addition to the same Piattelli Palmarini and the 
abovementioned Goodman e Putnam, also Alfred J. Ayer, Stephen J. Gould, Ronald D. Laing and Italo 
Calvino) met to discuss on how one should interpret the reality dealt, in one way or another, by their 
traditions of studies. They found that not only each discipline, form of knowledge, school of thought or 
single theory has to do with a reality different from the others (the summation of which breaks down the 
overall reality into a series of levels mutably manifold and scarcely integrable in a single model), but that 
even some of those points of view build worlds provided, in their turn, with some kind of articulation                                                         
2 For further comments on Gnoli (2012b) and on Kleineberg (2013) see Gnoli et al. (2016) and Kleineberg (2014). 
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(obviously always different and only at times of the emergentist kind) in layers or levels. There were no 
knowledge organization specialists among the speakers, but it is easy to imagine what could be (given the 
strong links between theories and KOS discussed in section 8) the impact in knowledge organization studies 
of this kaleidoscopic and labyrinthine exponential multiplication of the levels of reality, that leads to extreme 
consequences the "hyperrealist" approach described in section 7. 
The ontological approach to the levels of reality (which would constitute layers objectively connected 
between them in a univocal and stable way) and the epistemological one (in which the levels are built by the 
way in which reality is "cut out" by the various observers and therefore the same levels change over time and 
are incommensurable with one another) seem totally incompatible (Poli 2007, 33), but again Kleineberg, in a 
recently published paper, makes us suspect that they are not that much. Kleineberg (2016) begins his essay 
illustrating (fig. 1) the stratification of reality theorized by Hartmann (1940). Then he applies to it a series of 
formal transformations, some of which are taken from Poli (2001), that progressively move away from the 
linearity of the original pattern and introduce patterns in which a plurality of upper layers co-evolve from a 
lower layer. Then Kleineberg arrives (fig. 2) to the pattern proposed by Wilber (2000), rather complex, if not 
even baroque, in its elegance but which has the merit of supporting a hypothesis of solution of the 
millenarian philosophical problem of the relationship between mind and body (Nannini 2011), at least 
original, referring to the ancient tradition of panpsychism (Skrbina 2005), that Wilber tries to make 
compatible with contemporary science. 
 
 




Figure 2. Levels of reality according to Wilber, taken from Wilber (2000, 198).  
 
Both Hartmann's (1940) and Wilber's (2000) patterns are intended by their authors as ontological, that is 
as attempts to describe the real structure of the world, apart from out points of view, but the formal 
procedures of transformation used by Kleineberg (2016), whose incipit, moreover, refers to levels of reality 
as a "metaphore", and the multiplicity of the intermediate patterns elaborated during the transformation itself 
cannot but convey to readers a particular "epistemological" taste of the operation, also independently of the 
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will and the opinions of its creator. On the one hand, therefore, ontological levels of reality could also be 
seen as epistemological levels of reality but, on the other hand, why not assume (at least in principle) the 
possibility of an ontological structure of levels so articulated as to absorb in its inside also all the levels of 
epistemological kind? After all, the prevailing theory today of a physical world that includes billions of 
consciences, is not stranger, from a strictly logical point of view, than the theory of a single conscience that 
contains the entire physical universe. 
 
10. Phenomena and noumena  
 
As we have seen, in each of the examined concepts (information, document, knowledge, knowledge 
organization, level of reality) there are aspects both objective and subjective, as indeed even some authors 
that are often considered intransigent objectivists or subjectivists are forced to admit, not only because of 
possible contradictions intrinsic to their own theories as rather for the unavoidable complexity of the issues 
that they would like to solve. Such a coexistence is accomplished in different ways and in varying 
proportions within each of the examined concepts, all, by the way, closely intertwined. For example, at a 
metaphysical level, an extreme irrealism is difficult to sustain, because even the most radical construtivists 
admit that in any case there must be "something" that put up resistance to human knowledge that would 
otherwise be purely hallucinatory. At a practical level, instead, a position which would not be totally 
unacceptable is that of those who maintain that any type of KOS must be judged, after all, only on the basis 
of its social utility or, in any case, of its efficacy in solving specific information problems, because KOS are 
basically nothing but tools invented by human beings to improve their lives. 
Besides, not even radically solipsistic scenarios like the one imagined (in order to confute it) by Putnam 
(1977) and made popular by the film Matrix3 ("Are we brains in a vat, connected to a computer that provides 
us with the experience of reality?", D’Agostini 2013, 131-132) exclude the existence, at least, of a brain, a 
vat and a computer. And even Gorgias's possible nihilism ("Nothing exists. Even if something exists, 
nothing can be known about it. Even if something can be known about it, knowledge about it can't be 
communicated to others", see Reale 2004, 71-82) presupposes the existence of Gorgias himself. So much so 
that some defined realism a "non-controversial question" (D’Agostini 2013) because it it impossible to deny, 
keeping a minimum of logical consistency, that some kind of reality exists, and, in case, the controversy may 
rise only on what is deemed real and on how reality and our knowledge of it are structured. This latter 
question is not at all trivial, because "all that reaches us from the world are a few rays of light hitting our 
retinas, and a few air molecules vibrating at our eardrums — images and echoes. So how can we really know 
anything about the outside world? Where do our theories of the world come from and how do we get them 
right?" (Gopnik 2009, 75-76). Starting from so minimal sensory data it is hard not to foresee in the solution 
of the riddle some kind of role, not minimal this time, of our knowledge structures. 
If, as the philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) wrote, "the safest general 
characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato" 
(Whitehead 1929, 39), it is likely that the epistemology and the ontology of the last two centuries are, in 
turn, footnotes to that important footnote to Plato that is Immanuel Kant's Critique of pure reason 
(1781/1787). In this work Kant demonstrates on the one hand the impossibility for human intellect of 
knowing "noumena", namely "things-in-themselves" as they are, independently of our gaze and, on the other 
hand, that "phenomena", namely the only objects that we can really know, are strongly influenced by the 
fundamental and universal structures, both necessary and unavoidable (called "transcendental") of any 
possible knowledge of a human being. Much of the epistemology and of the ontology after Kant (including 
those that found, often tacitly, the studies on knowledge organization) can be reduced to phases of a long 
debate on the nature of those phenomena: are they mere appearances, compared to the authentic and 
unattainable reality constituted by noumena, or are they the only existing reality, relegating noumena to mere 
borderline cases, totally hypothetical as knowable only by a possible divine intellect? It is not easy to answer 
once and for all to this question, also because even Kant oscillated between a "realist" position in which he 
seemed to interpret phenomena as an appearance (in the first edition of the Critique, of 1781) and a                                                         
3 On the philosophical aspects of the three films of the series (The Matrix, 1999; The Matrix reloaded, 2003; The Matrix 
revolutions, 2003), all written and directed by brothers Andy and Larry/Lana Wachowski, see Irwin (2002 and 2005) and 
Cappuccio (2004). On the Cartesian roots and the philosophical fortune of the "brains in a vat" see Davies (2004). 
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"constructivist" position in which he instead interpreted them more decisively as reality (in the second 
edition, of 1878). There are even some critics who attribute to a different interpretation of Kant the great 
division in contemporary culture between "analytic philosophers" (who consider Kant as a constructivist) 
and the "continental philosophers" who consider him a realist (D’Agostini 2013, 108-112). 
 
11. Conclusions  
 
The discussion on noumena and phenomena is neither purely academic nor exclusively philosophical, 
because from the position taken in this debate, different trends may derive as regards each of the topics dealt 
with in this article and also a different nuance may arise in the way one can identify and call the coexistence 
of objective and subjective aspects that has emerged in relation to each of them. It is therefore possible that 
the fact that today there are so many ways (and names) to describe that coexistence depends also on a 
different interpretation (more or less aware) of Kant. For example, I should define as "moderate 
constructivism" (or, if you prefer, "realistic constructivism") the synthesis of objectivism and subjectivism 
that consists in recognizing that reality is neither completely "given" nor completely "built" and that it 
constitutes (beyond too marked pseudo-oppositions) the paradigm today de facto dominant both in 
epistemology studies and in knowledge organization studies. Dux (2011) instead prefers to speak  (reverting 
the concepts) of "constructive realism", Eco (2012) of "negative realism", Wuketits (1990) and Gnoli (in 
Bologna) of "hypothetical realism" based on the assumptions that have so far passed the scrutiny of natural 
selection and Hjørland (2004) finally opts for a "pragmatic realism". This latter would mean to recognize 
both that "our ontologies are implied by our theories and paradigms" (Hjørland 2004, 492) both that "we 
cannot freely invent arbitrary structures" (Hjørland 2004, 492), because "the world provides “resistance” to 
our conceptualizations in the form of anomalies, i.e., situations in which it becomes clear that something is 
wrong with the structures given to the world by our concepts" (Hjørland 2004, 492). Hjørland (2004, 492) 
attributes this position also to the famous epistemologist Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), yet acknowledging  
that often such a position is instead considered antirealist. 
In any case, beyond nuances, denominations and the attempt of both the opposite fronts to annex the 
moderate intermediate position, I believe that this approach may share the same aspirations to the synthesis 
between the ontological and epistemological needs expressed by Kleineberg (2013) as to his own theory of 
knowledge. 
  
In combining epistemology and ontology, this theory of knowledge seeks to integrate both the undeniable 
constructivism of human knowledge as well as its capability to reflect reality which is seen as partially independent 
from a human observer. In other words, neither the premise of pre-given ontic structures nor the premise of arbitrary 
epistemic constructions of reality are required, two extreme positions also known as the "myth of the given" invented 
by Wilfried Sellars and the "myth of the framework" coined by Karl R. Popper (Kleineberg 2013, 349). 
 
But it is not given that such aspirations are actually satisfied by the theories currently available in the 
fields of philosophy and knowledge organization (including Kleineberg's and the one drafted in this article) 
because this would mean that they had finally managed to solve convincingly a problem that has lasted since 
Presocratics times and that was reformulated in modern times by a post-Kantian bipolarization which is 
extremely difficult to escape from, also because it permeates deeply our own language. This bipolarization 
tends both to make anyone who reflects on these issues to take sides with an objectivistic or subjectivistic 
position and to attribute one of those position also to the theories that, in one way or another, would rather 
overcome their opposition, as the readers of this article and Kleineberg's (2013) probably will do. 
While waiting for a really persuasive theory of synthesis to emerge, maybe in the wake of Thomas 
Metzinger's (2009) reflexions, referable in turn to the empiriocriticism of Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and 
Richard Avenarius (1843-1896) and to Edmund Husserl's (1859-1938) phenomenology4, on the experience 
as a sort of neutral film between objectivity and subjectivity similar to the walls of a tunnel, what one can 
pragmatically do is to accept that "the coexistence of conflicting points of view, varying in detachment from 
the contingent self, is not just a practically necessary illusion but an irreducible fact of life" (Nagel 1979,                                                         
4 See Smiraglia (2012, 12-13 and 2014, 28-29) for an introduction to phenomenology’s relevance to knowledge organization 
studies and Budd (1995 and 2001) for the proposal of an epistemological foundation of library and information science on 
phenomenology. 
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213) and that "perhaps we are really doomed to be two-tier thinkers (thinkers at two levels: both realists and 
relativistics)" (Piattelli Palmarini 1984, 524), striving to use the term "objective" and "subjective" only in a 
relative and not in an absolute way ("this is more objective/subjective than that one") as we usually do for 
couples like "tall/short", for which sentences like "that child is tall" are commonly and correctly understood 
as abbreviations of "that child is taller than most children of his age". 
Besides, it will always be useful to remember that knowledge organization (as mentioned in sections 2, 3 
and 8) needs or, otherwise, takes advantage of approaches not only ontological and epistemological but also 
sociological. In some way they mediate between objectivity and subjectivity underlining how KOS not only 
organize something and do it from certain points of view, but for the most they follow modalities and aims 
shared within social groups more or less large, if they do not want to be relegated into irrelevance and 
condemned to unsustainability, although without excluding completely the justification also of forms of 
knowledge organization for their own sake (Gnoli 2013) or for strictly private use (Jones and Teevan 2007). 
In this way, rather than feeding a sterile debate between the positions of ingenuous "pure realists" and 
phantom "pure irrealists" (both in fact absent from the pages of the contemporary journals of both 
philosophy and knowledge organization studies) we could all accept that there are both facts and 
interpretations (D’Agostini 2013, 40) and discuss more calmly and more profitably on how many and which 
(more) objective and (more) subjective elements are involved in each specific knowing situation or are 
useful in each specific KOS. And perhaps we all could also share and apply also to KOS what Eugenio 
Lecaldano (1987) wrote about philosophical theories, summarizing Bernard Williams's (1985) position, that 
is to say that they "can be considered as large-mesh nets built to try to grasp the world, with the awareness 
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